市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

2 {5 g9 |+ c9 H: T% ]Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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& t3 O" T1 B4 O+ }5 x, F. yBackground remarks
1 C  j  M( w8 P  h Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
; ]  F7 l; [3 \; T6 v. kadjustments.
4 d) n: k% r% l3 ? This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
/ ?: h3 y  [+ @. J! O/ K# l: D1 Fsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
, v4 ?0 H" R& T/ E/ B* ? Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
7 O" T: b% {5 i8 g* \lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
6 T, C" F/ E% W" T We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
1 I6 z- }$ W1 M) Madjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
8 e# W. w3 G( C/ [reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
% T3 H  d. n# Z1 q! D: O* K The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
: h- Q& u+ |4 D8 f( T1 _2 I3 Uas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
/ {! _; u" i8 |8 E$ D In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
+ K) F+ w8 q  x! N! lAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
9 _# [3 ^8 _3 \$ R7 ^% H3 F The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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% _. j' e/ p7 G- F, VA look at credit markets
# O3 z  U1 n- d. S5 w4 Z Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
) [7 s& Z1 i. Z" Z6 [& iSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
- W4 @* a& Q" K) L  X( d0 i High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
2 j: a( o: B4 G  fbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
/ d' [1 e6 |5 H& O0 Ipositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
5 X) E0 @3 p0 r2 k7 `* {( T Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
& N: Q1 O* F! Zis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
# R$ K. Y2 K" |bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
" g4 P# `; Y" ]# D! D8 U Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
' q1 m; v* c- Z' T& ^emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
( C* m8 h' y+ m" t8 [- D* N! W Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
9 e$ G9 A( ~: ~the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
3 P+ q+ K& J  @( A9 R# P* }2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
1 m2 |1 N9 v  |: J# T3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
$ n9 V$ y$ n$ W! G- `; h; Mbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
" T5 G# E% h% A4 _, y* D9 s It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

% w1 t7 R5 q3 a, y6 ~8 I5 V/ N+ xConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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