市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
: c$ r7 ?8 X+ P; [2 @0 SJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
  b  ^) ^$ _& _3 v0 L9 ^: I Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
* y2 I* Y& ]- v5 l, a7 ?, Cas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
; w% G0 I/ U, q Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
2 c7 |6 ]5 D: \6 x This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
6 ]4 K& N$ y2 G  wlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
- R% t- m) k/ ~5 e3 z7 W$ s8 madjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
6 N% b) m1 y/ J) [  J$ {% O9 g Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
7 S. }" h2 N; ~" k  m4 y4 c- treduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
2 U- ]8 E) z- _6 O The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
' E6 P6 s4 E( q3 s6 J8 U; {! das funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
+ g* w1 u! k/ ^8 aimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
& }; ?! B' Y5 v' }4 jAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
9 d2 d! [3 i. M+ M$ J The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
! P8 Y( U  f; Kthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
% e/ k9 E4 z! k- U  \access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
) K0 m3 |% h9 ~: sCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
/ \. `( V7 I9 s* W! bpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
" q- o  t& V' y5 N# E, f6 A Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
" E' b! t8 u4 i- S2 E( mwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
- p/ T3 m8 Q6 k2 }, f/ h# Q9 Sis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
& L# u; o' K$ d. O6 u2 m$ s  J/ p$ Ubankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
8 M2 ]- i6 ~1 U3 k9 ^# i European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
+ p8 S" G7 z; E; itoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
! K$ V8 N/ |* N5 v Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
$ O' N$ g: r, C/ C3 z As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
6 z5 {9 K) w& z; X3 L) x1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
! x8 x7 H; m/ W- P  @% Y2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
! g% |! `/ \& o0 B& j) t3 Q, n3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
7 L& d8 K9 I+ \0 ]5 l4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
& f# X; l# p1 y4 o  l It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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! w  U0 Q1 _( Y2 l& jConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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